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Abstract
The paper defines, implements and compares two empirical tests of relevant markets. While the
European SSNIP test compares an initial industry equilibrium to an out-of-equilibrium situation,
the FERM test compares the same initial equilibrium to an other equilibrium outcome. Hence, it
is more in line with the behavioral assumptions of the underlying model of industry equilibrium
and this can have significant consequences. We define these concepts formally and apply them
to the industry of computer servers by estimating a model on a large dataset. We find several
smaller relevant markets in the low-end segment of servers.
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1 Introduction
A traditional step in antitrust investigation is to delineate the relevant market, which consists
of all products competing with each other. This paper defines, implements and compares two
empirical tests of relevant markets when products are differentiated. One is the SSNIP test. It
is based on demand substitution and defines a relevant market as a set of products, whose prices
can be raised jointly profitably. The other test is the Full Equilibrium Relevant Market (FERM)
test. Based on both demand and supply substitution, it defines the relevant market as the set
of products whose average price would be significantly raised at equilibrium if they were priced
by a hypothetical monopoly or jointly determined by a cartel. The SSNIP test compares an
observed industry equilibrium to a hypothetical out-of-equilibrium outcome. The FERM test,
on the other hand, compares the same observed industry equilibrium to an other, hypothetical,
equilibrium. This motivates its name as a ’full’ equilibrium test. Hence, the FERM test is an
attempt to exploit the structure of the underlying industry model. We define these concepts
formally and apply them to the industry of computer servers that provides an excellent field of
application.
Servers are at the core of hot policy debates. More precisely, the definition of relevant markets
for server operating systems is a controversial issue in a recent antitrust case. We cannot address
it due to data limitations that prevent us to separate the software from the hardware. Our focus
is here on the market for servers which constitute a good candidate for illustrating our procedure
because servers are highly differentiated. Indeed servers are key elements of computer networks
enabling very different types of clients to access and use these networks. In other words, this
paper is aimed at testing how our methodological concept can be applied in industry analysis.
To do so, we use a large, aggregate dataset of computer servers sold worldwide. We build and
estimate an oligopoly model of differentiated products with discrete choice demand. Using this
workhorse, we implement our relevant market tests. We find several smaller relevant markets,
especially in the low-end segment. This suggests that differentiation is so strong that it constrains
significantly substitution opportunities.
Its equilibrium nature makes the FERM test more consistent with the underlying economic
theory. First, the FERM test takes into account that a hypothetical cartel would face different
strategic responses from competitors. Second, the test evaluates proper multiproduct pricing
strategy. None of these is true for the SSNIP test. Hence, as opposed to this latter, the FERM
test might be able to provide a finer picture of the industry in question. The difference can
be both quantitatively and qualitatively significant. We find examples in our application where
the joint and uniform price rise in the SSNIP test is unprofitable, but the FERM test shows
that, in the same case, due to proper multiproduct pricing strategy, a hypothetical cartel could
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profitably raise average price of its products. These differences would yield different conclusions
about relevant market sizes and, hence, would support different policy decisions.
Given an estimated industry equilibrium model, the FERM test does not imply significantly
larger computational complexity than the SSNIP test: The FERM test is technically not different
from the methodology used to evaluate mergers in the literature on differentiated products mar-
kets, see e.g., Ivaldi and Verboven (2004). More precisely, it is equivalent to the measurement of
effects of coordination due to a cartel. This is in line with the new European merger regulation.
(See the Act of the European Council, 2004.)
Two contributions in relation with our paper are worth to be mentioned. Brenkers and Verboven (2004)
estimate a discrete choice demand model for the European car industry and run SSNIP tests
to find relevant markets. Their results suggest that rigorous econometric market testing proce-
dures can delineate finer market structure than conventional wisdom. Van Reenen (2003) uses
basically the same world-wide server data as we do and attacks the question whether low-end
servers, in his definition, products below $100.000, are on the same relevant market as more
expensive systems. From several demand models, he estimates price elasticity of this low-end
group. Instead of implementing the SSNIP test, he argues that this elasticity is too low, meaning
that there is no substantial substitution away from these products. Hence, he states that the
relevant market can not be larger than the investigated group. It is interesting to note that our
results do not validate the arbitrary threshold of $100.000 set by Van Reenen. We find more
fragmentation.
Indeed, competition authorities most often do not implement relevant market tests rigorously.
Our conclusion on this point is that proper application of SSNIP or FERM tests might result
in more fragmented market structure. This, in turn, could change possible reactions of compe-
tition policy. For example, having many smaller relevant markets can be an argument against a
proposed merger. That is why we emphasize the importance of implementation of more rigorous
and formal testing procedures in such cases in order to support economic policy decision making.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces formally the relevant market concepts.
Section 3 discusses briefly the main features of the server industry. Section 4 builds up the model,
whose estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses results from implementing
the relevant market tests. Section 7 concludes.
2 Relevant market tests
The relevant market of a given product is the smallest set of products, including the product
itself, which, as a whole, does not face significant competition from other products. That is,
the only competitors of this given product are those in the set. A relevant market test is an
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algorithm that determines, which products belong to the relevant market of a given product.
The size of the relevant market is crucial for competition policy, for example. A product, despite
its low sales figures, can have large market share and, hence, potentially a large market power if
its relevant market is small, everything being equal.
Any relevant market test is aimed at measuring the strength of competition a given prod-
uct faces from other products. For example, in its guidelines to assess relevant markets, the
EU Commission (1997) identifies three forms of competitive constraints: demand substitution,
supply substitution and potential competition. Demand substitution is the most immediate com-
petitive constraint on suppliers. At each decision, a producer must bear in mind that customers
can change supplier relatively easily and quickly. Supply substitution refers to the strategic re-
sponse of competitors to moves of the producer. The response of competitors can be fast when it
is about to change their price, for instance. However, supply responses of competitors, when they
involve significant additional investment (marketing efforts, product development for instance),
can be much slower than demand substitution. Finally, potential competition means the entry
of new competitors into the industry. This is the slowest competitive constraint.
The definition of relevant market must involve the degree to which each of these three com-
petitive constraints are considered. From a competition policy perspective, it is worth to take
into account only the fastest operating disciplinary forces at the market definition stage. The
slower effects of competition are considered usually in a later phase of competition policy analysis
(see e.g., again, the EU Commission, 1997).
The present paper defines and implements two relevant market tests, which differ in the
degree to which they consider the various sources of competitive constraints in their underlying
relevant market definitions. The SSNIP test considers only demand substitution, while the
Full Equilibrium Relevant Market test, or FERM test, takes also into account strategic price
adjustments of competitors, a form of quick supply substitution.
There is an other crucial difference between the two testing procedures. The SSNIP test
compares the observed industry equilibrium to a hypothetical out-of-equilibrium situation. On
the contrary, the FERM test compares the same observed equilibrium to an other, hypothetical,
equilibrium, motivating the term ’full’ in the name of the test. In other words, the FERM test
takes into account more completely the structure of the underlying economic model. In this sense,
its simulations are more realistic. Also, this equilibrium nature brings the FERM test closer to
other methodologies used to support policy decision making, e.g., in merger evaluations. We will
explore this point below too.
This section introduces these ideas formally in relation to a general differentiated products
industry with oligopoly supply. In this industry there are J differentiated products and F
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multiproduct firms.1 Each firm produces a mutually exclusive subset of the products. Let q(p)
be a J-dimensional vector function, which gives demand for each product as a function of the
Jx1 vector of prices p. On the supply side, there is a Bertrand pricing game2: Each producer
chooses its own products’ prices to maximize joint profits generated by this subset of products,
taking into account that all the other competitors behave similarly. The Nash equilibrium of this
game is given by the pricing function p(q), which is a J-dimensional vector function that gives
optimal prices as a function of any demand vector function. We define industry equilibrium as
a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game and the corresponding vector of demands, where that
latter is generated by the q(.) function. Formally:
Definition 1 : Industry equilibrium. A nonnegative pair of J × 1 vectors (p, q) constitutes an
industry equilibrium if and only if p = p(q(p)) and q = q(p).
Product level profits are given by π(p) = (p − c) • q(p), where c is the vector of constant,
product specific marginal costs. Also, denote the vector of consumer surpluses by cs(p). Later in
the paper, for all these functions we will provide parametric examples, which we estimate using
real data. The next two subsections define the two alternative relevant market tests. The third
subsection discusses some practical problems.
2.1 The SSNIP test
The SSNIP test bases its relevant market definition on demand substitution solely. The relevant
market of a specific product j is the smallest subset of products, including product j, for which
applying a Small but Significant, Non-transitory Increase in Price, or SSNIP, to each element of
this subset - letting prices of other non-included products unchanged - generates an increase in
the level of joint profits. Formally:
Definition 2 : SSNIP relevant market of product j. Let M ⊆ J and j ∈ M . Let (p, q) denote
an initial industry equilibrium and πi(p) the profit generated by product j when prices are given
by p. Let pssnip be a price vector whose jth element is equal to (1+κ)pj if j ∈M , and equal to pj
otherwise, where 0 < κ ≤ 0.1. Then, M is the SSNIP relevant market of product j if and only if
(i) 4πssnipM ≡
Ã P
j∈M
[πj(pssnip)−πj(p)]P
i∈M
πi(p)
!
∗ 100 > 0, and
(ii) for all M 0 ⊆ J, such that j ∈M 0 and M 0 satisfies (i): #(M)≤#(M 0).
1J also denotes the set of all products.
2The Bertrand assumption is not necessary. Our tests can be carried out using any other pricing and, hence,
equilibrium assumption.
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Condition (i) is the profitability criterion of the SSNIP, while condition (ii) states that the
relevant market should be the smallest among those satisfying condition (i). The magnitude of
the price increase is set by κ and it usually takes a small value. The implementation of the SSNIP
test is the following. Pick a product as a first candidate relevant market set, and check whether
it satisfies the relevant market definition alone. If so, we conclude that this product constitutes
itself the relevant market. If not, add an other product to the candidate relevant market set and
do so until the test is satisfied. The set of products defined by this procedure constitutes the
relevant market because the joint profits generated by these products increase when their prices
increase.
The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, the price increase applied to the products
included in the candidate relevant market raises markups. On the other hand, it diverts sales to
products with unchanged prices. When the first effect dominates the second one, i.e. if joint prof-
its increase, products outside the set do not provide a sufficiently strong competitive constraint
in the form of demand substitution. In other words, the joint market power of the candidate
relevant market is large enough to make the hypothetical price increase jointly profitable. If joint
profits decrease, we conclude that the relevant market is larger than the candidate set.
In practice, when checking a given candidate set we proceed as follows. First, we estimate a
parametric model of demand and pricing functions. This amounts assuming the observed data
were generated by an industry equilibrium. Using estimation results, we calculate operating
profits generated by each of the products belonging to the candidate set. By summation, we
obtain the joint profit generated by the set. Second, we apply a price increase in a magnitude
comprised between one and ten percent to all products belonging to the set, keeping unchanged
the prices of other products. Using the estimated model we simulate how demand and, hence,
profits are changed. Note that the outcome after the hypothetical price increase is not neces-
sarily an equilibrium: Since the test considers only demand substitution we do not assume that
competitors adjust their prices.
The SSNIP test is often called the ’hypothetical monopolist’ test. Indeed, the test implicitly
assumes that there is a hypothetical firm or decision maker, which coordinates the pricing of
products in the candidate set and carries out the price increases. It is important to emphasize,
however, that the hypothetical decision maker in the SSNIP test is a monopolist only in the sense
that it controls a subset of all products, i.e., only on the candidate relevant market, while, in the
economic literature, the term ’monopolist’ usually refers to a firm monitoring all products in an
industry. To avoid confusion, we do not use the term ’hypothetical monopolist’ in the sequel and
instead, we keep using the acronym SSNIP.
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2.2 The FERM test
As already mentioned, the SSNIP test compares the estimated industry equilibrium to a hypo-
thetical out-of-equilibrium outcome. It does not consider the strategic behavior of competitors
as it only analyzes the effects of demand substitution. Now, if the prices of products in the
candidate relevant market increase, producers of other products may respond strategically, e.g.,
by changing their prices. This price reaction could affect the delineation of the relevant market
because it could modify the relative profitability of changes in prices. Consequently, the defini-
tion of the relevant market should account for the combined effects of short term demand and
supply substitutability. To do so, we must relax the implicit assumption of absence of strategic
behavior of agents, which they might never display in equilibrium. In other words, we should
compare the initial industry equilibrium to an other equilibrium situation.
The objective is still to assess the joint market power embedded in the candidate relevant
marketM . To solve this exercise when competitors react strategically, we proceed as if a change
in the product ownership structure of the industry occurs. Indeed, we consider that a hypothetical
cartel is formed comprising all producers of the candidate set’s products. It is equivalent to a
hypothetical merger of these producers, which now behaves as a multiproduct firm. The cartel
would maximize joint profits generated by its products, assuming price setters of other products
react strategically. We propose to calculate the new equilibrium, associated with this ad hoc
ownership structure, and compare before and after equilibrium prices and consumer surpluses.
To do so, we define below criteria measuring the ’distance’ between the initial and the partially
collusive equilibria. A ’large’ distance indicates that the market power embedded in the products
of the candidate relevant market is significant and, hence, this candidate set can be thought of
as a relevant market.
Let (p, q) be the initial industry equilibrium. Let (pferm, qferm) be the new industry prices and
quantities, when the prices of products in the candidate relevant market set are set collusively
by the hypothetical cartel. Define the following indices:
Definition 3 : Equilibrium Relevant Market Price (ERMP) and Equilibrium Relevant Market
Consumer Surplus (ERMC) Indices for a set of products M :
ERMPM ≡
½µP
j∈M p
ferm
j qjP
j∈M pjqj
¶
− 1
¾
∗ 100,
ERMCM =
½µ P
j∈M cs
ferm
jP
j∈M [cs
ferm
j +(p
ferm
j −cj)q
ferm
j ]
¶
/
µ P
j∈M csjP
j∈M [csj+(pj−cj)qj]
¶
− 1
¾
∗ 100.
The first index, ERMPM , is a measure of changes in prices of products in the candidate
relevant market. The price of set M is defined as the weighted average price of products in
M . The index gives the percent change of this average price when the industry switches from
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its initial equilibrium to the partially collusive one. A large positive index indicates that the
producers of products in the candidate relevant market can raise profitably their prices despite
the competitors’ strategic responses. This happens if the candidate relevant market is indeed
a relevant market, that is to say, if its products’ joint market power is sufficient large. As the
weights in the formula for ERMPM are the quantities in the initial industry equilibrium, our
measure is a Laspeyres index.
The index defined by ERMCM compares relative consumer surpluses. Here, relative con-
sumer surplus is the ratio of consumer surplus generated by the products in M to the total
surplus generated by the same products. Total surplus is the sum of consumer surplus and pro-
ducer profits. The ERMCM index is the percent change in this relative consumer surplus when
equilibrium is switched. Relative consumer surplus describes the split of total welfare between
consumers and producers. If, from one equilibrium to an other, consumer surplus decreases rel-
ative to total surplus, then the ERMCM index would be negative. Intuitively, the producers in
the candidate relevant market join in a common multiproduct firm to obtain a larger share of
total welfare. By lessening competition among their products, these producers jointly increase
their market power. If all or most of the members in the candidate relevant market do not
have outside competitors, that is to say, when the candidate set is a relevant market, then the
cartel would bring a significant decrease in the intensity of competition that is translated into a
’significantly’ negative value for the ERMCM index.
For both indices, the question is to a priori define when the distance between the two equi-
libria is considered as ’large’. A complete reply deserves further research. At this point, we
assume that there exists a threshold value that defines a ’significant’ change. It is an arbitrary
step, analogous to the exogenously set price increase in the SSNIP test. In practice this thresh-
old is supposed to take values in the range comprised between 5 and 15 percent. We give two
FERM relevant market definitions, one for the ERMP index and an other for the ERMC index.
Formally:
Definition 4 : FERM relevant market of product j for index ERMP . Let M ⊆ J and j ∈M .
Consider κ, a small positive value. Then, M is the FERM relevant market of product j if and
only if
(i) ERMPM > κ,
(ii) for all M 0 ⊆ J, such that j ∈M 0 and M 0 satisfies (i): #(M)≤#(M 0).
Definition 5 : FERM relevant market of product j for index ERMC. Let M ⊆ J and j ∈M .
Consider κ, a small positive value.. Then, M is the FERM relevant market of product j if and
only if
(i) ERMCM < −κ,
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(ii) for all M 0 ⊆ J, such that j ∈M 0 and M 0 satisfies (i): #(M)≤#(M 0).
Conditions (i) state that the rise in equilibrium prices or the decrease in consumer surplus
should be ‘significant’, and conditions (ii), again, state that the relevant market should be the
smallest among those satisfying condition (i).
As we compare an initial equilibrium to an other equilibrium, the test is called a Full Equi-
librium Relevant Market test. Note that it compares an observed or estimated equilibrium to
a hypothetical and simulated equilibrium. Once an equilibrium model of an industry is ob-
tained, i.e., has been estimated, the implementation of the FERM test is straightforward with a
numerical routine.
Since it exploits the equilibrium structure of the underlying behavioral model, the FERM test
should provide a finer picture of the investigated industry. For instance, as it properly takes into
account the multipricing strategy of the hypothetical cartel, it allows the joint entity not to raise
the prices of all its products at the same rate, because it considers the substitutions between
these products, besides substitutions towards competitor products. This feature is confirmed in
our application, where we provide evidences that the SSNIP test can be seriously misleading (see
Subsection 6.2.). Summing up, the equilibrium nature of the FERM test and the fact that it is
technically equivalent to the tools used to evaluate other policy questions, e.g., mergers, should
make it more appealing from a policy perspective.3
2.3 Some practical problems: set expansion paths, multiplicity
The procedure to implement any of the relevant market tests starts by considering a given product
as an initial set, and then add to this set other products until the ‘smallest set’ that passes the
test is defined. At each step of this iterative process, the question is to choose the product to
be added to the set. From a given product, many ‘paths’ can yield the same set. As long as the
total number of products remains relatively small, examination of each path is feasible. As soon
as the set of products becomes large, one must apply a short cut. Here, where the number of
3In the case of mergers, Michael Katz criticized the SSNIP test. In his lecture held at the UK Competion
Commission in London (March 2004), he declares provocatively: ” [...] one could go so far as to question why one
inquires at all about what a hypothetical monopolist would do. Rather than make predictions about a hypothetical
monopolist, why not make predictions about actual suppliers? Specifically, why not ask directly whether the merging
parties would find it profitable to raise price by a significant amount post merger? That is the question whose
answer matters for cosnsumer welfare. If one possesses the answer to this question, the answer to the hypothetical
monopolist question is completely superfluous.” Michael Katz goes further than we do in the sense that he proposes
to omit relevant market testing completely in the case of merger evaluations. We retain from his declaration that
supply side effects must be taken into account. We believe that improved tests for defining the relevant markets
are useful as compagnon of more traditional approaches or methods.
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potential paths is enormous, we propose to select the particular path that starts with the lowest
priced product and to increase the set for the candidate relevant market by adding the second
lowest priced product, and so on.
A related question is the possible multiplicity of relevant market sets. For a given product, one
could find different ‘smallest sets’. In small applications, one can test each possible combination
and check for multiplicity of relevant markets. However, in large applications the number of
combinations to be calculated and analyzed in a meaningful way is limited by computational
feasibility. This might reduce the sharpness of conclusions to be drawn as, in such cases, there is
an uncertainty on the precise definition of relevant markets. Comparing the results of different
methods for defining relevant markets could be a way to reduce the risk of error in practice.
For instance, to find many more relevant markets by applying our methodology than another
procedure should invite to perform further investigation. Before going into the details of our
model and results, however, we briefly describe the industry.
2.4 Relevant market definitions and competition policy
It is interesting to have a look at the relevant market definition process in the practice of compe-
tition policy. The SSNIP test we use in this paper is equivalent to the European Commission’s
definition (EU Commission (1997)):
The question to be answered is whether the parties’ customers would switch to
readily available substitutes or to suppliers located elsewhere in response to a hypo-
thetical small (in the range 5 % to 10 %) but permanent relative price increase in
the products and areas being considered. If substitution were enough to make the
price increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss of sales, additional substitutes
and areas are included in the relevant market. This would be done until the set of
products and geographical areas is such that small, permanent increases in relative
prices would be profitable.
The US practice is different and has a longer history. First, the 1982 Merger Guidelines of the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission gave the following definition:4
[A] market is as a product or group of products and a geographic area such that
(in the absence of new entry) a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made all the sales
of those products in that area could increase its profits through a small but significant
and nontransitory increase in price (above prevailing or likely future levels).
4The quotations below, as well as their sources, can be found, e.g., in Werden (2002).
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In 1984, there was a small change in the text to make sure that the hypothetical firm is profit-
maximizing. That is, the question is not whether a small price increase would be profitable but
whether the profit maximizing hypothetical firm would indeed make the small price increase.
That was not, however, a substantial change as the intention of the 1982 Guidelines was the
same, the 1984 modification was only a clarification (see e.g. Werden (2002)). So, the 1984 MG
definition is the following:
Formally, a market is as a product or group of products and a geographic area
in which it is sold such that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject to
price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products in that
area would impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price above
prevailing or likely future levels.
The 1992 Merger Guidelines definition brings a slight but important change:
A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area in
which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not
subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of
those products in that area likely would impose at least a small but significant and
nontransitory increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are
held constant. A relevant market is a group of products and a geographic area that
is no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test.
This definition still assumes the profit maximizing behavior of the hypothetical firm of the
candidate market but it constrains the price of competitor products to be unchanged. So, the
definition of the European Commission is the SSNIP test of this paper, and the 1984 US Merger
Guidelines definition is consistent with the FERM test. The 1992 MG definition is in between
the two. It is similar to the FERM test since it looks for the profit maximizing price of the
hypothetical entity of the candidate relevant market. However, as it assumes no price changes
from the competitors, its outcome is out-of-equilibrium, and so, in this respect, it is like the
European SSNIP test.
3 The computer server industry
Servers are important building blocks of computer networks. Most large organizations, such as
private companies, government agencies, universities, build up their own computer networks,
which interconnect different computer machines. The main task of these networks is to enable
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employees to communicate and access to various informations and services. A typical network
consists of client and server computers. Client computers are most often PCs that, in particular,
allow users to access servers of the network, besides storing data and running software appli-
cations. Servers connect clients and provide network services, which can vary from network to
network. These services include: connecting clients to internal networks; authentication of users
to define and apply access rights of different levels; storing data and files for common access to
the network’s clients; providing access to common printers; running e-mail services; faxing; pro-
viding access to large databases (e.g., financial, accounting), possibly with specialized software
run on the server; running application softwares (‘outsourcing’) and providing extra computing
power; running websites of clients; providing internet access; and providing security services (e.g.,
internet firewalls).
A server may not always provide all of these services. An organization may use several servers
for different purposes, which may require to build more than one network. These networks, in
turn, may or may not be interconnected. Moreover, both server and client computers have their
own hardwares and softwares, which could be identical or could differ substantially. So one of
the key issues in computer networking is the interoperability of client and server computers. Not
surprisingly many server manufacturers emphasize that their servers interoperate seamlessly with
any client server operating system. All these possible situations oblige the organization wishing
to build its own network to choose a particular network architecture, or ‘solution’, which fits the
best its goals. The same task can be accomplished, for example, using several smaller servers
with one processor each or using one big, multiprocessor server computer. Optimality of these
different architectures depends on network size, specificities of applications and the organization’s
existing networks.
Accordingly, server manufacturers differentiate their products substantially, not only by con-
sidering different technical characteristics, but also by applying different commercial approaches.
There are three main business models. The first is the vertically integrated approach. In this
business model, the manufacturer produce both hardware and software for servers. The main
examples are IBM’s mainframe computers, run under its proprietary operating system softwares,
OS390 and OS400, or servers produced by SUN, SGI, HP or DEC, using their own proprietary
flavor of the UNIX operating system. The advantage of the integrated approach is that producers
can coordinate the joint development of hardware and software.
The second business model involves vertical disintegration. Here, manufacturers specialize
either in software or hardware. The most common hardware configuration is based on Intel
processors. The operating system software is proprietary, e.g., Microsoft’s Windows or Novell’s
Netware. In the non-integrated approach, coordination between hardware and software firms is
less tight than in the integrated case. However, significant standardization enabled manufacturers
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to gain from higher specialization, which is the main advantage of vertical disintegration.
The third business model is the open source approach. Here, as in the non-integrated ap-
proach, hardware is typically an Intel-compatible architecture. The software, however, is not
proprietary. The most common open source operating system is Linux, which is considered by
many as a UNIX clone, and whose source code is freely downloadable from the web. Further-
more, it can be freely modified and its developments are shared among members of the virtual
programmer community via Internet.
Several server sellers use different business models in a parallel way. For example, IBM
sells not only servers with its own proprietary operating system, but also machines with Linux
installed on. Moreover, producers often sell not only servers, but also installation, training
and maintenance services. In addition, companies often have their own IT departments and
computer engineers or use outside consultants to build networks. All these make, the otherwise
quite heterogenous, customers very well informed and, consequently, economic models of discrete
choice demand and differentiated-products market particularly suitable for studying the server
market.
We have a large data set, detailed in Appendix A, on servers sold worldwide. At this point
we may make more precise the objective and the scope of our empirical analysis in relation with
the policy debate which concerns servers. As it is known, the European Commission states that
Microsoft uses its quasi monopoly on the PC operating system market to control interoperability
on the market for low-end servers’ operating systems to build up a dominant position in this
market. (See Commission Decision, 2004). Part of the debate is about the size of relevant market
for operating systems of workgroup servers, i.e., servers that perform file, print, group and user
administration tasks. The Commission carried out its relevant market investigation based on
customer surveys, from which it had micro level information on functionalities, interoperation
properties, details on the type of operating systems, processors and multiple usages, as well as
many qualitative information. From its study, the Commission claims that there is a relevant
market for workgroup server operating systems5. Microsoft debated this claim.
The information available in our aggregate data set does not allow us to address this debate.
For instance, we cannot identify multiple choices, nor different Windows operating systems. Nor
do we observe server operating system prices and, hence, and perhaps even more importantly, we
do not observe possible nonlinear pricing schedules between operating system sellers and hardware
5More precisely, the Commission proves that work group operating systems are not on the same relevant
market as operating systems of large, enterprise level servers. The Commission does not investigate whether the
group of work group operating systems can be split up into more, smaller relevant markets (i.e., condition (ii) of
Definitions 2 and 4-5 is not investigated). This method of the Commission is practical since even this less precise
characterization of relevant markets suffices for its goal.
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manufacturers. To say something reliable about relevant markets of operating systems, these
data, joint with additional modeling of the strategic game between these players, are essential.
Because of the complexity of these issues, deriving price elasticities of operating systems from
those of servers is here an insufficient approach to test relevant markets for operating systems.
Because of these constraints, we focus on the relevant market tests for server computers. The
empirical application illustrates how our proposed methodology can be fruitfully applied in an
industry analysis. To implement the implied relevant market tests, we first build an economic
model of the industry.
4 The model
The market for servers is structured in three parts. First we describe demand for computer
servers using a static discrete choice model. Second, on the supply side, a multiproduct oligopoly
structure is constructed. Third, a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium assumption closes the model.
4.1 Demand
We use the standard methodology to model demand for differentiated products. This amounts
to projecting products into the space of characteristics. Heterogenous customers value products
through these projections. There are three regions: Japan, US and West Europe and twenty-
one quarters of observations in each region. Each region-quarter pair is defined as a separate
market. That is, customers located in a given region-quarter pair can make a purchase only at
this market. In region m at quarter t there are Nmt potential customers.
Customer i on market mt can choose among Jmt differentiated products and the option of
not buying anything (denoted by 0). Its conditional indirect utility from product j is given by:
uijmt = xjmtβ − αpjmt + ξmt + ξjmt + εijmt
≡ δjmt + εijmt, j = 0, ..., Jmt,
where δjmt is the mean utility, common to all customers at market mt, and εijmt is the customer-
specific mean zero utility term. The mean utility depends on xjmt, a K-dimensional vector of
observed product characteristics; on pjmt, the price of product j; on ξmt, a market-specific fixed
effect; and on ξjmt, an unobserved product characteristic. We observe in xjmt such characteristics
as number of processors or motherboard type. However, there are product characteristics known
to the customer but not observed in the data, as, for example, quality of the hardware, quality of
technical support or design. The effect of all unobserved product-specific variables, which affect
utility by shifting product quality, is summarized by ξjmt. Customers can also choose an outside
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alternative by not buying any new server, which we denote as ’product’ 0. This may reflect, for
example, substituting computer servers by more traditional means of organizing the works of the
customer or buying a used server or using an other information technology. The mean utility of
the outside alternative is normalized to 0, i.e., ui0mt = εi0mt.
Products also have characteristics that are varying across customers. Their contribution
to utility is reflected by the term εijmt. We have only market level data and no information
on individual customer characteristics. Hence, the εijmt terms are unobserved too. We can,
however, assume that they have a specific distribution. In general, it is natural to assume that
the preferences of a given customer are not uncorrelated across products. For example, computer
servers with the same operating system are certainly perceived by customers as closer substitutes
than products with different operating systems.
For this reason, we adopt a nested logit model that collects products ‘closer’ to each other into
separate groups. In particular, we partition all alternatives in a given market into G mutually
exclusive groups. These are, G={SU, MP, 0}, where SU stands for workgroup servers with
either uniprocessor or symmetric multiprocessing processor architecture, and MP for servers
with massively parallel processing architecture, and 0 for the outside alternative (this group has
only one element). Each group, except group 0, has Hg mutually exclusive subgroups, according
to operating systems. That is, for g=SU and MP, H g={L, NW, NT, OS400, OS390, VMS,
UNIX, O}, where the subgroups are Linux, NetWare, Windows NT, IBM OS400 and OS390,
Open VMS, Unix and other operating systems, respectively.
Based on this choice tree, we adopt three assumptions on the correlation structure of the
εijmt terms. First, the ε’s are uncorrelated across customers and across region-quarter markets.
Second, for a given customer, the ε’s belonging to the same group are more correlated with each
other than with the ε’s of any other group. Third, for a given customer, the ε’s belonging to
the same subgroup are more correlated with each other than with the ε’s of any other subgroup.
Cardell (1997) shows that one can find such a distribution by writing
εij = ε
i
gmt + (1− σG)εihmt + (1− σH)εijmt, j ∈ h ⊂ g, ∀i,∀j,
where εigmt, ε
i
gmt + (1− σG)εihmt, and εigmt + (1− σG)εihmt + (1− σH)εijmt all have extreme value
distribution, with 0 ≤ σG ≤ σH ≤ 1. is related to σG. The highest σG, the highest the
correlation within the same group. Similarly, the highest σH , the highest the correlation among
the same subgroup.
In other words, our nested logit model of customer choice has three hierarchical levels. At
the top level, the customer decides among groups: whether to buy a computer server or not,
and if so whether to buy a server with uniprocessing/symmetric-multiprocessing architecture or
a machine with massively parallel multiprocessing architecture. At the middle level, he or she
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chooses among subgroups in the chosen group, i.e., among operating systems. At the bottom
level, the customer chooses a server product from the chosen subgroup. The model is static, the
three choices are made at the same time. The hierarchy reflects the assumption that customer
preferences are more correlated for more ’similar’ products, where this similarity is approximated
by grouping6.
Following McFadden (1981), if 0 ≤ σG ≤ σH ≤ 1 and α > 0, then the preference structure is
consistent with random utility maximization. That is, assuming that each customer chooses the
alternative yielding the highest utility one can derive choice probabilities of each product. Fur-
thermore, given our distributional assumptions, the market level choice probabilities, or market
shares, at market mt are:
sjmt =
exp(δjmt/(1− σH))
Dhg
D
(1−σH)/(1−σG)
hg
Dg
D
1/(1−σG)
g
D
, j ∈ h ⊂ g, j = 0, ..., Jmt,
where ’inclusive values’ are defined asDhg =
P
j∈h⊂g exp(δjmt/(1−σH)),Dg =
P
h⊂gD
(1−σH)/(1−σG)
hg ,
and D =
P
g⊂GD
1−σG
g .
The formula of market shares can be log-linearized, as proposed by Berry (1994). Arranging
and using vector notation, the result is:
ln s− ln s0 = δ + σH ln ss/h + σG ln sh/g + ξ,
where s, s0, ss/h and sh/g are the
³P
m,t Jmt
´
× 1 vectors of market shares, the share of the
outside alternative, within subgroup shares and shares of subgroups within groups, respectively.
Unobserved product characteristics and mean utilities are stacked in the vectors ξ and δ, respec-
tively. This latter can be further decomposed as δ = xβ − αp + ξm, where x, p and ξm are the
respective vectors of observed characteristics, prices and market specific fixed effects. Finally,
the vector of demands is simply given by q(p) = s(p)N .
4.2 Pricing
We specify each market mt as a multiproduct oligopoly. From now on, we suppress the subscript
mt without loss of generality. There are F firms each producing a subset Jf of the J products.
For firm f , profit equals the sum of its operating profits for each products minus its fixed cost
K. The operating profit for product j equals the sales of the product times the markup, which
6The nested logit model belongs to a subclass of the random coefficient model, popularized by Berry (1994)
and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The BLP model is more general in specifying unobserved heterogeneity,
we use nested logit only because of the ease of exposition. We should emphasize, however, that our tests can be
used with BLP demand as well.
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equals price minus the constant marginal cost cj. Formally:
Πf(p) =
X
j∈Jf
(pj − cj)qj(p)−K
We assume Bertrand competition: Each producer sets the prices of its products so as to
maximize its total profits, assuming that the others behave similarly. Each player has a similar
trade off: On the one hand, increasing the price of one of its products increases the markup
on this product. On the other hand, the same price increase decreases sales of the product by
shifting customers towards other alternatives. In addition, a multiproduct firm takes also into
account the fact that rising the price of a product shifts customers, partly towards its own other
products, partly towards those of other producers. These arguments are summarized in the
first-order condition associated with the profit maximizing price for product j of firm f :
qj(p) +
X
k∈Jf
(pk − ck)
∂qk(p)
∂pj
= 0.
The Nash equilibrium of the pricing game is a system of prices, which solves the corresponding
first-order conditions of all products. To see this, we write the system of first-order conditions
in vector notation. Define the J × J matrix θ as the firms’ product ownership matrix, whose
element (j, k) equals 1 if products j and k are produced by the same firm, and 0 otherwise. Let
s(p) be the J × 1 market share vector, ∇s(p) be the J × J Jacobian matrix of derivatives with
respect to prices, and c be the J × 1 vector of marginal costs. With this notation, the J first
order conditions can be written as:
s(p) + [θ •∇s(p)0] (p− c) = 0,
where • denotes the element-by-element multiplication of two matrices of same dimension.
The p vector of prices satisfying this matrix equation is the Nash equilibrium of the pricing
game. Let us express this vector as:
p = c− [θ •∇s(p)0]−1 s(p) ≡ c+m(s(p)),
that is, price equals marginal cost plus the markup. Finally, since we do not observe marginal
cost directly we model it as a function of product characteristics:
cj = wjγ + ζ + ζj,
where wj is an L-dimensional vector of cost shifters, with the associated vector of parameters γ,
ζ is a market specific fixed effect and the error term ζj summarizes the cost effect of unobserved
characteristics for product j.7
7Note, again, that our data set is rather limited: we do not have cost observations. Additional information on
this, joint with a more realistic model of costs, would certainly improve sharpness of conclusions from our relevant
market testing procedures.
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4.3 Correcting for computing power
Servers differ significantly both in price and in the scope and nature of tasks they can accomplish.
A server machine can cost from a few thousand to several million dollars. Accordingly, they
differ in capacity, computing power and the range of possible usages. Hence, if we are to measure
substitutability of different machines, which is at the core of relevant market tests, we cannot
compare directly, say, one unit of a large server system to one unit of a small workgroup server.
Obviously, even if there is substitution between small and large machines there must be a scaling:
Though tasks solved by a larger system cannot be solved by a much smaller machine, they can
be accomplished, at least in principle, by using several smaller machines. In other terms, one
should recognize the possibility of multiple choice. To fully address this question, one way is to
use customer level data and to estimate a multiple discrete choice model as in Hendel (1999).
As we only have aggregate data, we cannot identify the multiple choice structure in customer
preferences directly. In our model, the customer can choose only one of the alternatives. However,
we propose to account for this problem by modifying the measure of quantities in the model.
For each server model at a given region/quarter market, we multiply the quantity sold of
the model by the number of CPUs. Implicitly, the customer now chooses between ‘computing
powers’ or ‘computer solutions’, instead of just buying a certain number of server products.
These ‘solutions’ are now the products and are highly differentiated. Their prices are determined
by the prices of original server machines. Then, producers price the number of units of servers
sold and customers value ‘solutions’.
CPU numbers alone provide a rough measure of computing power. Ideally, one would control
for computing power by taking also into account other characteristics like the speed of processor
or the size of short run memory. Unfortunately, we do not have any of these variables. Hence,
our choice is dictated by the lack of relevant quantitative variables in our dataset.
Accordingly, the demand and pricing equations are modified as:
ln sc − ln sc0 = δ + σH ln scs/h + σG ln sch/g + ξ (1)
p = c−
£
θ • (∇sc(p) • CP )0¤−1 ¡D−1sc(p)¢ ≡ c+m(sc), (2)
where the superscript c relates to the corresponding shares calculated from the quantity times
CPU numbers variable, e.g. sc = s • cpu, where cpu is the vector of CPU numbers; D is a J × J
diagonal matrix with cpuj in its (j, j) position, for all j, zero elsewhere; CP is a J × J matrix,
whose j’th row’s each element is 1/cpuj. Note that ∇sc(p) • CP = ∇s(p) and D−1sc(p) = s(p).
The vector of predicted units sold as a function of prices remains q(p) = s(p)N .
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Industry equilibrium is characterized by the pair of vectors (p, q) satisfying equations (1)-(2).
Assuming the observed data is generated by the equilibrium described above, the parameters to
be estimated are α, β, γ, σH and σG.
5 Estimation
We use our large, aggregate data set, described in Appendix A, to estimate the model. Despite
its size, the data set is not particularly rich in terms of explanatory variables (see Table 1
in Appendix C). We can capture computing power only in an approximative way and we do
not observe customer level decisions. This lack of data has led us to drop a few observations
corresponding to server systems priced above $1 million, because it was fairly impossible to
identify these products. After many experiments, dropping these data was the only solution
to get reasonable estimates of marginal costs and markups for all other products. On the one
hand, the difficulty we faced in integrating those few servers in our estimated model could be
considered as an indication that these products are intimately so much different than the rest of
the data that they can be excluded from the potentially largest relevant market. On the other
hand, it is not clear what results one would obtain with appropriate micro level data, observing
rich technical characteristics and customers’ multiple choices, using a finer discrete choice model.
Obviously, this feature reduces the sharpness of conclusions to be drawn. Nonetheless, despite
the limitations of the data set, our estimation provides a relevant description of the working of
markets for servers. The first subsection presents our econometric specification while the second
one discusses the estimation results.
5.1 Econometric specification
From the loglinearized demand (1) and the first order conditions of price-equilibrium (2) we
derive in Appendix B the two equations of the system to be estimated, that is to say:8
ln scjmt − ln sc0mt = xjmtβ − αpjmt + σH ln scj/hgmt + σG ln sch/gmt + ξmt + ξjmt
pjmt = wjmtγ +mjmt(smt) + ζmt + ζjmt, ∀j,∀m,∀t.
The left hand side terms are the log market share minus the log of the market specific share
of the outside good in the demand equation and the price in the price equation. The vectors
8We derive these forms analytically to reduce the computational burden. In principle, we could do the matrix
inversion in (2) numerically during estimation. However, we can write the inverse analytically by using the
economic structure of the model, see Appendix B. This increases the speed and accuracy of the estimation. Our
method is similar to, although slightly different from, that of Foncel and Ivaldi (2004) and Verboven (1996).
18
of product characteristics, x and w, comprises the same variables. These include dummies for
operating systems, motherboard type and for rack optimized systems, variables indicating the
number of CPUs, the CPU capacity and the number of rack slots. We interact all these variables
with processor architecture dummies. In both equations, we estimate different coefficients on
these characteristics for uniprocessor servers, symmetric multiprocessing servers and for massively
parallel multiprocessing servers. Market specific fixed effects ξmt and ζmt, are specified as country
and quarter dummies (interacted with architecture dummies).
The econometric error term of the demand equation is ξjmt, which we interpret as the unob-
served quality of product j. Similarly, we define ζjmt as an unobserved cost shifter of the product.
Hence, they are likely to be correlated with endogenous variables on the right hand side, namely,
with prices and shares. This endogeneity problem necessitates instrumental variable estimation.
Following Berry (1994), we assume that the space of observed characteristics, spanned by
x and w, is exogenous. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) describe that optimal instruments
can be approximated efficiently by polynomial series. Furthermore, basis functions of these
polynomials are also valid instruments and can be calculated easily for the model. So, we use
the basis functions, as well as x and w, as instruments. We estimate the system by nonlinear
three-stage least-squares estimation. This exploits further correlation between the error terms of
the two equations. Appendix A.3 provides the list of instruments.
5.2 Estimation results
Tables 2-4 present estimates. The coefficient on price (−α) has the right sign and it is significantly
different from zero. The values of density parameters describing unobserved heterogeneity of
customers are consistent with random utility maximization (i.e., 0 ≤ σG ≤ σH ≤ 1). Both,
σG and σH are significantly different from zero and 1. First stage R-squares for α, σG and σH
are 0.56, 0.84 and 0.46, respectively, and show that our instruments can capture movements
of endogenous variables. When we regress estimated residuals from our demand and pricing
equations on the instruments used F-tests show that these regressors are jointly insignificant
in both case (p-values are 0.88 and 0.67 for the Nulls of joint insignificance). That is, our
instruments are valid. A further evidence is that OLS estimate of α is 0.08, much lower than
our 3SLS estimate. We know that uncorrected endogeneity problem in a demand system biases
downward the price variable’s coefficient in absolute value.
On the demand side, actual and potential number of processors (ccount and ccapac) are valued
positively by customers. Note that, as it is corrected for ‘computing power’ (see subsection 4.3),
the number of processors (ccount) is a relative measure. Rack optimized and PC servers provide
higher value for customers. In general, the Open VMS is the least and the IBM OS390 is the
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most valued operating system. Time dummies are increasing over time, with some seasonality
of the first quarter. On the supply side, we find, not surprisingly, that simpler CPU architecture
servers (SMP and UP) have a cost advantage over more complicated MMP machines.
Implied mean marginal cost is 76% of price (with 23% standard deviation). Mean own price
elasticity is 41%. The reason for this relatively high value is that it is an individual product
level statistic: We have many products, especially at the low-end segment, which are close to
each other in technical terms. A further evidence for this is that aggregate elasticity of products
priced below $100.000 is only 0.64%. The high number of relatively similar products can also
explain the high values of preference parameters σG and σH .
6 Implementing the SSNIP and FERM tests
As the number of products is large here, we cannot check all possible ways to construct the
smallest set of products. We proceed as follows. We begin by taking all products priced below
$2000 as a candidate set and check whether it constitutes a relevant market9. If not, then we
examine all products below $3000. If this augmented set is still not a relevant market we continue
expanding it by the next set of products between $3000 and $4000. We continue this procedure
until finding a relevant market. Having done this, we repeat the procedure starting from the
lowest priced products above the first relevant market.
This procedure can be implemented for a specific geographic market-quarter pair (e.g., Japan
in the first quarter of 2001) or for some aggregate as well (e.g., all three geographic areas in
the year 2000). We carried out simulations for the SSNIP tests by fixed-point iterations. A
typical calculation for a country/quarter pair (around 400 observations) took about 15 seconds
on a standard laptop PC. FERM simulations are computed using a Davidon-Fletcher-Powell-type
quasi-Newton method. Here a typical simulation took about 45 seconds.
6.1 SSNIP results
Table 5 presents results for a 5% SSNIP test for the first quarter of 2001 in the US. That is,
we calculated profit changes in this region/quarter pair from a hypothetical 5% increase in the
price of the corresponding sets. The first two columns define a candidate relevant market: In
each row, the first column gives the lower price limit of the candidate relevant market, while the
second column gives its upper price limit. All products priced between these two limits belong
to the candidate set. The last column gives 4πssnipM , i.e., the percent change in total profits.
9There are no products priced below $1000 in the data. That is why we start our procedures by a set bounded
above by $2000.
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For example, the second row of the table shows that the first candidate relevant market
examined is the set of products priced below $2000. A 5% increase in the price of these products
decreases their profits by 0.4%. Hence, we augment our candidate relevant market set by adding
products priced between $2000 and $3000. The result from a 5% SSNIP, displayed in the third
row, is a 0.2% decrease in profits. So, we still did not find a relevant market and proceed by
expanding the candidate set. This is done in the fourth row, where we find that products priced
below $4000 constitute a SSNIP relevant market since their joint profits increase (by 1.4%)
following a 5% price increase. Similarly, we find a second relevant market (products priced in the
range $4000-$8000) and a third one too (range $8000-$400,000). In all these tables horizontal
lines separate relevant markets.
Figure 1 summarizes the same information. Here, the horizontal axis represents the upper
price limit of candidate sets, and the vertical measures percentage changes in profits. There are
three series displayed: The first, PL_0, where all servers priced below in the upper limit are in
the tested set. The second, PL_4000, where the lower bound of the tested set is $4000, and the
third, PL_8000, where this lower limit is $8000. The boundaries of relevant markets are at the
points where the series turn to the positive region, i.e., above the horizontal axis.
As for Europe and Japan, Table 6-Figure 2 and Table 7-Figure 3 displays the 5% SSNIP test
results, respectively. In Europe, we find relevant markets with the same size as in the US. In
Japan, the picture is slightly more fragmented. The basic pattern in all three cases is similar:
one can identify several smaller markets below $25,000.
Tables 8-10 summarize results from 10% SSNIP test, i.e., in these cases we simulated the
effects on profits from 10% price increases in the candidate sets. In general, the size of relevant
markets increase and, in the case of US and Europe, the method cannot even identify the third
relevant market anymore. The reason for this is that a 10% general price increase involves much
bigger demand substitution than a 5% one. As a result, one must include more products in the
candidate set to have increasing joint profits. Even in this stronger test, however, the general
pattern remains, which shows several smaller relevant markets in the low-end part of the product
scale. In some sense the SSNIP tests, when it is fully implemented, is able to account for the
high differentiation of servers.
6.2 FERM results
Tables 11-16 display results from the FERM test simulations. The structure of tables is similar
to that of the previous ones in that the first two columns define a candidate relevant market
by giving the lower and upper price limits, respectively. In the tests displayed in Tables 11-13
decision is based on ERMPM , which gives the percent change in the price of the candidate set
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when the industry switches from its initial equilibrium to the partially collusive one. The value
of this index is represented in the last (the fourth) column. These tests define a relevant market
when the index first goes above 10%. Tests in Tables 14-16 are based on the relative consumer
surplus index, ERMCM , which is represented in the fourth column. Here, a relevant market
is defined when the value of the index is less then -15%. As previously, horizontal lines within
tables indicate bounds of relevant markets found.
FromTables 11-13, we observe that, except for the US, the first relevant markets found by 10%
FERM tests, i.e., products priced below $4000, are identical to those found in basically all SSNIP
tests. Above these, the second and third relevant markets are pretty close to SSNIP results.
However, FERM tests identify more relevant markets, that is, they display more segmentation,
especially at the low-end regions. We also ran 5% tests and found even more segmentation. That
can be because the FERM test takes also account strategic responses of rival producers. Here
substitution comes not only from the demand but also from the supply side. More substitution
makes easier for a given candidate set as to qualify as a relevant market. The size of higher-end
relevant market is more ambiguous, which reflects perhaps the shortcoming we outlined above
that it was not possible to set up a demand model including the largest, i.e., above $1 million,
server systems. These latter omitted products are certainly true competitors of those products
we could not classify in relevant markets above. Figures 4-6 summarize information of Tables
11-13 in a graphic way.
The relative consumer surplus based FERM tests, presented in Tables 14-16, show an even
more fragmented picture. Using this decision rule, we find several smaller relevant markets in
the low-end and middle region. In the case of Europe and Japan, we even find one in the higher
end of our data used. The result that comes out clear from comparison of the previous tests is
that low-end servers, defined roughly as products below $25,000, are not on the same relevant
market as higher-end server systems. The same conclusion would have applied if we had started
to build up candidate sets from the highest price towards lower levels.
Tables 17-19 provide comparative summary statistics by geographical areas. Both, the SSNIP
and FERM tests find several relevant markets in the low-end segment. Especially the 5 and 10%
SSNIP tests give similar results as 10% FERM tests using the ERMP criterion. However, the
FERM test has a stronger tendency to deliver smaller relevant markets as the decision criterion
becomes stronger. As we explained, this test takes into account possible strategic behavior of all
market players. Hence, it is more realistic and is able to detect finer movements in the industry.
As a consequence, with appropriate data, the FERM test can delineate more accurately possible
relevant markets than the traditional SSNIP test.
Finally, let us illustrate the difference between the two approaches by a revealing example.
The second line in Table 8 presents the result of a 10% SSNIP test for Q1 2001 US. The candidate
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relevant market is products priced below $3000 and profits decrease by 0.6% after all product
prices in the candidate set were increased by 10%. The second line of Table 11 presents the
FERM test results for exactly the same case. Here, the hypothetical cartel increased average
price almost exactly by 10%! But of course this increase is profitable. This is due to appropriate
multi-product pricing. By not taking into account own product substitutions and strategic
responses from competitors the SSNIP test can be misleading.
7 Conclusions
In general terms, we establish here that the econometric estimation and testing of relevant
markets outlined above is fruitful as a supportive tool of economic policy decision making. More
specifically, we define two empirical tests of relevant markets and outline their implementation
strategies. As an example, we build and fit an equilibrium model on a large aggregate data set
on the computer server industry. Using estimation results it is equally easy to implement the
SSNIP and FERM tests.
In all considered cases, we found several smaller relevant markets and probably many more
that we could expect. One reason for this result can be found in the high degree of differentiation
among servers that constrains significantly substitution opportunities. The other reason is simply
the fact that we apply rigorously the principles of relevant market definitions. In practice, relevant
market definitions are not implemented formally, they are used only as a framework of thinking
about the problem. The proper application of tests might result in more fragmentation in the
market structure found. This conclusion can be important for example in merger cases.
Although both tests can detect market segmentation, the FERM test is able to provide an
even finer picture of an industry. This follows from its greater consistency with the underlying
economic theory, as opposed to the out-of-equilibrium nature of the SSNIP test. In our appli-
cation, the consequences of this difference are quantitatively significant too. Hence, the FERM
test should provide a more accurate tool for economic policy analysis.
As for the specific case of servers, we see two main areas whose more detailed information can
be important and could even change both, qualitative and quantitative results. First, customer
level information could tell us many things about patterns of multiple purchases and network
architecture. From here, we could see more clearly substitution patterns, which are crucial in
relevant market testing. Second, micro level data could also unveil usage of server products. This,
again, would lead to a finer map of customer preferences. For example, internet ‘outsourcing’ can
make such server products closer substitutes, which might not have been before. These patterns,
of course, cannot be seen in our aggregate data set. Nevertheless, we should point out that the
emphasis of this paper is on relevant market testing procedures, and these, with appropriate
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changes, can also be applied to models using micro level data.
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A Data
A.1 Data collection and description
The data are available from IDC, a marketing firm. IDC collects server data in a quarterly/annual
framework built up from three main tiers (IDC (1998)). These are vendor polling, financial
modeling and end-user channel surveying. The final data base is set up from these three sources
after numerous and rigorous cross-checkings. In the vendor polling phase, major vendors, channel
and supplier partners are interviewed, using an electronic polling form. This takes place on a
quarterly, regional, country and worldwide basis. The main informations collected are vendor,
family and model data, initial server shipments (ISS) and upgrade shipments, operating system
shares, pricing, CPU and configuration data.
In the next step, IDC uses detailed financial models to decompose factory revenues to the
vendor, family and model level. Various publicly available financial information sources, press
releases and third-party reports are used. Results are cross-checked with vendor polling data to
have consistency. Finally, IDC interviews thousands of end-users on an annual basis. It surveys
companies from all sizes, all industries and all geographical territories. Installed base, shipment
and revenue data are cross-checked with previous results. Having finished all three steps, a
further global preprogrammed cross-checking is run.
The final dataset includes quarterly observations of three countries/regions (Japan, USA,
West Europe) for the period Q1 1996 - Q4 1997, and of eighteen countries (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, UK and USA) for the period Q1 1998 - Q1 2001. That is,
in the first part of the sample we have only aggregate data for West Europe and country level
observations in the second part. In all geographic territory/quarter pairs, we have observations
for the major vendors (their total number is 36), their server families and models. For each
vendor/family/model slot, we observe technical characteristics like operating system (Linux,
Windows NT, NetWare, IBM OS400 and OS390, Unix, VMS and other); CPU type (IA32,
CISC, RISC); CPU architecture (UP, SMP, MPP); CPU capacity; CPU count; a dummy for
whether the system is rack optimized; the number of rack slots; and a dummy for PC servers.
Also, we observe the number of shipments, either initial server shipments (ISS) or upgrades; and
customer revenues.
IA32 type CPUs are the Intel architecture-based 32-bit processors, including Pentium, Pen-
tium Pro and Deschutes processors. CISC, which abbreviates complex instruction set computers,
is the traditional type of processing. These computers have large instruction sets, with both sim-
ple and complex instructions of variable lengths. RISC, reduced instruction set computers, have
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a processor design with smaller instructions set, with fixed-length formats. It is produced by
Digital, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems. These servers typically
support Unix platform software.
There are three CPU architectures observed. UP denotes uniprocessor servers, which contain
only one processor. SMP, symmetric multiprocessing, denotes the capability of the architecture
to support more than one processors, symmetrically. This latter means that processors have equal
access to storage devices. SMP is a generalization of the UP structure, hence SMP computers
can use programs written for UP machines. MPP denotes massively parallel processing, where
typically a large number of processors is used, but they are not treated symmetrically in the
architecture.
The CPU count is the average number of CPUs shipped per model, at a given geographical
area/quarter pair. CPU capacity is the maximum number of possible CPUs per server model.
It is an integer, ranging from 1 to 128. PC servers are desktop systems designed specifically as
servers. These have typically enhanced capacity and redundant hardware components, relative
to ’ordinary’ PCs, and have Intel architecture.
Customer revenue is the sum spent on a given model, at a given market. It includes the price
of all shipments, peripherals attached by channel and channel margin. It is measured in current
US dollars. We calculate the price paid by a customer for a given model by dividing customer
revenue by the number of shipments.
A.2 Necessary transformations
Since our theoretical model is microeconomic we need relative prices, instead of nominal ones. We
choose to use real prices. These are calculated as follows. First, for a given model sold in a given
country/quarter market, from the current dollar price we calculate current price denominated in
the currency of the country. We use the quarterly average dollar market exchange rate10. Next,
we calculate real price by dividing home currency denominated price by the country’s consumer
price index, which we normalize to 1 in Q1 1996. Finally, we multiply the resulting real price,
at each quarter and country, by the constant, average Q1 1996 dollar/home currency exchange
rate. This gives real prices denominated in a common currency: the 1996 first quarter dollar.
This price is real in the sense that it measures the price of a given server system, sold in a given
country, relative to the 1996 first quarter value of the CPI basket of this country. It is expressed
in terms of average Q1 1996 dollar to get comparability not only within but also across countries.
In the first part of the sample, i.e., from Q1 1996 to Q4 1997, to calculate the necessary
CPI index and exchange rate for Western Europe we use the fact that in the second part of
10All necessary macroeconomic series were downloaded from IMF’s IFS database and from the OECD website.
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the sample we have country level observations in this region. For the first sample period, we
calculate a weighted average of CPIs of the sixteen European countries found in the second part
of the sample. Weights are proportional to average total customer spending on servers in these
countries between Q1 1998 and Q1 2001. The aggregate dollar exchange rate series is calculated
similarly. Note that we could have used some official series, the euro exchange rate and the
euro zone or EU15 CPI, for example. These series, however, cover a slightly different set of
countries that we have in our data. Moreover, official weightings are more related to differences
in general consumption structures across countries. Using server expenditure based weights is
more appropriate in our application, as it tracks more closely the general price inflation hitting
server product customers. That is, we take into account more efficiently the mass of information
we have.
To calculate shares, we must determine the number of potential customers Nmt at a given
country/quarter pair. We follow Ivaldi and Verboven (2004) choosing first a market specific
base quantity and make Nmt proportional to it. The coefficient of proportionality is called by
Ivaldi and Verboven the potential market factor. We choose the yearly average of employment
level of a given country as a base quantity in a given country/quarter pair, or Emyt, where yt
denotes the year of quarter t. This assumes that computational needs of customer companies
depend on the number of their employees. Most generally, computer servers are used to organize
work. Although in some cases they are substitutes of human work, increasing employment surely
increases the number and complexity of companies’ tasks related to organization of work. This
is the underlying rationale to use the aggregate employment level as the base quantity. Then,
Nmt = (1 + τ)Emyt, where τ is the potential market factor, whose value, after a number of
trials, we set at -0.96. Product shares are given by shipments divided by the number of potential
consumers. We use initial server shipments only and exclude upgrade shipments.
For the second part of the sample, i.e., from Q1 1998 to Q1 2001, we aggregate observa-
tions from Western European countries into one single region. Observations belonging to the
same quarter, vendor, family, server model, operating system, CPU architecture, server class
(PC server or not), rack type (rack optimized or not) are aggregated into one. Shipments and
employment are summed, while CPU capacity, CPU count and rack slot numbers are averaged,
weighted by shipments. For each individual European country, we calculate real prices as de-
scribed above. These are averaged using shipments as weights, again. So, in the final data set we
have observations in three regions for the whole sample period: Japan, US and Western Europe.
We restrict our analysis to servers priced below $1 million. The list of variables is displayed in
Table 1. The total number of observations used in estimation is 32273.
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A.3 Instruments
To estimate our model, we use the following instruments for a given product at a given region-
quarter market. First, the exogenous characteristics of the product. Second, we use a set of
polynomial basis functions of exogenous variables exploiting the three-way panel structure of
our data: We calculate instruments from the same market: the number of other products of the
same producer, the sum of CPU capacities of rival producers’ products, the number of firms;
also, the number of other products of the same producer and the number of firms in the same
group; finally, the number of other products of the same producer in the same group and same
subgroup. Instruments from the other two regional markets at the same time are: the number
of other products of the same producer, the sum of CPU capacities of rivals’ products; the
number of competitors producing products in the same group and the number of competitors
producing products in the same group and same subgroup. Finally, we use also the number of
other products of the same producer at the same regional market, in different time periods; and
the number of other products in the same group and same subgroup, of the same producer at
the other two regional markets, in different time periods.
B Product specific markups
We derive the markup mj charged by firm f on a product j, which belongs to group g and
subgroup h and it is sold on a specific region/quarter market mt, as a function of quantities and
parameters only. First, define qcj ≡ qj ∗ cpuj, where q is the quantity sold and cpu is the number
of CPUs of the product. Define Qcg and Qchg as
P
i∈g q
c
i and
P
i∈h⊂g q
c
i , respectively. Also, define
dhg ≡ ( 11−σH −
1
1−σG )
1
Qchg
, dg ≡ σG1−σG
1
Qcg
and d0 ≡ 1Nmt . Then, own and cross price-derivatives are
∂qcj
∂pj
= αqcj [−
1
1− σH
+ qcj(dhg + dg + d0)],
∂qcj
∂pi
= αqcjq
c
i (dhg + dg + d0), i, j ∈ h ⊂ g, i 6= j,
∂qcj
∂pi
= αqcjq
c
i (dg + d0), i, j ∈ g, i ∈ h0 ⊂ g, j ∈ h ⊂ g, h 6= h0,
∂qcj
∂pi
= αqcjq
c
id0, i ∈ g0 ⊂ g, j ∈ g ⊂ g, g 6= g0.
Operating profit of firm f is given by
πf =
X
j∈Sf
(pj − cj)qj(p),
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where Sf denotes the set of products sold by the firm at market mt. The first order condition
of profit maximum with respect to the price of product j is:
0 =
∂πf
∂pj
= qj + (pj − cj)
∂qj
∂pj
+
X
i6=j,i∈Sf
(pi − ci)
∂qi
∂pj
= qj + (pj − cj)
∂qcj
∂pj
1
cpuj
+
X
i6=j,i∈Sf
(pi − ci)
∂qci
∂pj
1
cpui
,
where we used the fact that ∂qi∂pj =
∂qci
∂pj
1
cpui
. Substituting own and cross price derivatives and using
the definition of qcj we can write:
0 = qj + qjcpuj
α
1− σH
(pj − cj)
1
cpuj
+αqjcpujdhg
X
i∈h∩Sf
(pi − ci)qicpui
1
cpui
+αqjcpujdg
X
h0∈g
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qicpui
1
cpui
+αqjcpujd0
X
g0∈G
X
h0∈g0
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qicpui
1
cpui
.
Simplifying and rearranging gives the markup as a function of markups, quantities and parame-
ters:
(pj − cj) = (1− σH)[
1
α
+ cpuj[dhg
X
i∈h∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi
+dg
X
h0∈g
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi + d0
X
g0∈G
X
h0∈g0
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi]].
The goal is to express markup as a function of quantities and parameters only. Multiply both
sides by qj and sum up over j ∈ h ∩ Sf :X
j∈h∩Sf
(pj − cj)qj =
1− σH
α
Qfhg + (1− σH)Qcfhg[dhg
X
i∈h∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi
+dg
X
h0∈g
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi + d0
X
g0∈G
X
h0∈g0
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi],
where Qfhg ≡
P
i∈h∩Sf qi and Q
cfhg ≡
P
i∈h∩Sf q
c
i . Introduce further notation: Γhg ≡ 1−σHα Qfhg
and Λhg ≡ (1− σH)Qcfhg. Then, solving for the fixed point:X
j∈h∩Sf
(pj − cj)qj =
Γhg
1− dhgΛhg
+
Λhg
1− dhgΛhg
[dg
X
h0∈g
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi
+d0
X
g0∈G
X
h0∈g0
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi].
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Similarly, we sum up this expression over h ∈ g, introduce notation: Γg ≡
P
h∈g
Γhg
1−dhgΛhg ,
Λg ≡
P
h∈g
Λhg
1−dhgΛhg , and solve for the fixed point:X
h∈g
X
j∈h∩Sf
(pj − cj)qj =
Γg
1− dgΛg
+
Λg
1− dgΛg
[d0
X
g0∈G
X
h0∈g0
X
i∈h0∩Sf
(pi − ci)qi].
Finally, sum up over g ∈ G, let: Γ0 ≡
P
g∈G
Γg
1−dgΛg , Λ0 ≡
P
g∈G
Λg
1−dgΛg , and solve for the fixed
point: X
g∈G
X
h∈g
X
j∈h∩Sf
(pj − cj)qj =
Γ0
1− d0Λ0
≡ Σ0.
Then, X
h∈g
X
j∈h∩Sf
(pj − cj)qj =
Γg
1− dgΛg
+
Λg
1− dgΛg
d0Σ0 ≡ Σg,
X
j∈h∩Sf
(pj − cj)qj =
Γhg
1− dhgΛhg
+
Λhg
1− dhgΛhg
[dgΣg + d0Σ0] ≡ Σhg,
which gives us
mj = pj − cj = (1− σH)
½
1
α
+ cpuj[dhgΣhg + dgΣg + d0Σ0]
¾
.
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C Tables
Table 1: List of variables
variable description mean∗ st dev∗
IA32 Intel architecture based processors 64% 48%
CISC complex instruction set computers 9% 29%
RISC reduced instruction set computers 26% 44%
UP uniprocessor servers 26% 44%
SMP symmetric multiprocessing servers 72% 45%
MPP massively parallel processing servers 2% 13%
RACK Rack optimization dummy 3% 17%
UR Number of rack slots 1.5 3.2
SERVER PC servers 40% 49%
LINUX Linux operating system 7% 25%
NT Windows operating system 20% 40%
NETWARE Novell’s operating system 15% 35%
OS400 IBM’s operating system 3% 17%
OS390 IBM’s operating system 3% 17%
UNIX Unix operating system 2% 14%
VMS Open VMS operating system 32% 47%
OTHEROS other operating system 18% 39%
CCOUNT number of CPUs 2.7 14.4
CCAPAC maximum number of CPUs possible 6.0 39.7
PRICE real price in millions of Q1 1996 USD 0.1 0.2
JA Japan 22% 41%
US USA 40% 49%
WE Wester Europe 39% 49%
Total number of observations 32273
∗Means and standard deviations are percentages if the variable is a dummy and scalars otherwise.
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C.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2: Main Parameters of Interest
parameter estimate st dev
α 10.506 0.134
σH 0.978 0.003
σG 0.85 0.015
Table 3: Demand Parameter Estimates
main characteristics
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
NetWaresmp 0.161 0.022 NTsmp 0.224 0.033
OS400smp 0.247 0.046 OS390smp 1.586 0.100
OpenVMSsmp -0.451 0.052 Unixsmp 0.228 0.025
Otherossmp 0.215 0.022 Unixmmp 1.292 0.125
NetWareup 0.134 0.040 NTup 0.205 0.046
OS400up -0.220 0.056 OS390up 1.024 0.102
OpenVMSup -0.740 0.067 Unixup 0.112 0.042
Otherosup 0.144 0.036 serversmp 0.916 0.029
CISCsmp 2.770 0.049 RISCsmp 0.704 0.027
ursmp -0.009 0.001 racksmp 0.079 0.024
ccapacsmp 0.008 0.0003 ccountsmp 0.044 0.001
CISCmmp 2.908 0.644 RISCmmp 2.915 0.808
ccapacmmp 0.003 0.0003 ccountmmp 0.001 0.001
serverup 0.635 0.048 CISCup 0.355 0.049
RISCup -0.111 0.049 urup 0.011 0.007
rackup 0.214 0.075 constant -4.083 0.066
Note: All variables in Table 3 and 4 are interacted with either UP (up ending), or SMP (smp ending), or
MMP (mmp ending). Variable names are explained in Appendix A and also in Table 1.
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Table 3 (cont.): Demand Parameter Estimates
firm fixed effects
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
acersmp -0.160 0.060 Amdalsmp -0.628 0.075
ASTsmp -0.289 0.074 copqsmp -0.146 0.056
Cprexsmp 0.442 0.158 Craysmp -32.96 0.724
dtgensmp -0.342 0.061 dellsmp -0.125 0.057
digismp -0.687 0.060 fujismp 0.258 0.062
Fujsimsmp -0.054 0.060 Gatwsmp -0.224 0.058
Bullsmp -0.466 0.072 hwpdsmp 0.130 0.056
Hitachsmp -0.095 0.061 ibmasmp -0.292 0.056
ICLsmp -0.713 0.081 Intgrsmp -0.204 0.087
Micronsmp -0.112 0.065 Mitsusmp 0.022 0.064
Motorsmp -1.630 0.120 NCRsmp 0.115 0.060
NECsmp -0.052 0.056 olivsmp -0.128 0.064
Othervendorsmp -0.375 0.057 Seqtsmp 0.997 0.079
silismp 0.502 0.064 Siemsmp 0.037 0.058
Stratsmp 1.071 0.062 suunsmp -0.704 0.064
Tandemsmp -0.272 0.104 Toshsmp -0.294 0.062
Unisyssmp -0.018 0.058 VaLinsmp 0.020 0.129
copqmmp -3.490 0.819 fujimmp -5.715 0.846
Fujsimmmp -8.049 0.891 hwpdmmp -0.344 0.811
Hitachmmp -3.225 0.666 ibmammp -3.854 0.795
ICLmmp 1.617 0.997 NECmmp -2.623 0.833
Othervendormmp -4.533 0.795 Siemmmp -1.042 0.830
Tandemmmp -4.027 0.811 acerup 0.062 0.043
Amdalup -0.252 0.098 apleup 0.015 0.079
ASTup -0.134 0.075 copqup 0.036 0.031
dtgenup -0.320 0.064 dellup -0.123 0.070
digiup -0.175 0.035 fujiup 0.137 0.041
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Table 3 (cont.): Demand Parameter Estimates
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
Fujsimup 0.058 0.053 Gatwup -0.162 0.098
Bullup 0.524 0.082 hwpdup -0.058 0.033
Hitachup -0.063 0.050 ibmaup 0.065 0.031
Mitsuup 0.313 0.042 Motorup -0.408 0.089
NCRup -0.004 0.066 NECup 0.157 0.035
olivup 0.077 0.048 Siemup 0.011 0.035
suunup -0.337 0.053 Toshup 0.970 0.054
Unisysup -0.118 0.085 VaLinup 0.257 0.179
region dummies
jasmp 0.077 0.013 ussmp 0.706 0.010
jammp 0.514 0.082 usmmp 0.659 0.067
jaup 0.067 0.021 usup 0.564 0.017
time dummies
q296smp 0.021 0.033 q396smp 0.105 0.032
q496smp 0.207 0.031 q197smp 0.188 0.031
q297smp 0.241 0.031 q397smp 0.397 0.031
q497smp 0.566 0.030 q198smp 0.464 0.030
q298smp 0.377 0.030 q398smp 0.451 0.030
q498smp 0.602 0.030 q199smp 0.501 0.030
q299smp 0.591 0.030 q399smp 0.603 0.031
q499smp 0.708 0.030 q100smp 0.745 0.031
q200smp 0.874 0.030 q300smp 0.912 0.030
q400smp 1.047 0.030 q101smp 0.921 0.031
q296mmp 0.705 0.155 q396mmp 0.918 0.152
q496mmp 1.272 0.149 q197mmp 1.538 0.149
q297mmp 1.135 0.157 q397mmp 0.695 0.161
q497mmp 0.465 0.174 q198mmp 0.518 0.159
q298mmp 0.234 0.159 q398mmp 0.616 0.168
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Table 3 (cont.): Demand Parameter Estimates
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
q498mmp 1.390 0.165 q199mmp -0.767 0.196
q299mmp 0.394 0.173 q399mmp 0.257 0.183
q499mmp 0.407 0.181 q100mmp -0.245 0.189
q200mmp -0.539 0.177 q300mmp -0.028 0.179
q400mmp 0.911 0.176 q101mmp -0.834 0.184
q296up -0.041 0.038 q396up 0.089 0.038
q496up 0.201 0.038 q197up 0.225 0.038
q297up 0.236 0.038 q397up 0.319 0.038
q497up 0.408 0.038 q198up 0.326 0.039
q298up 0.103 0.040 q398up 0.287 0.042
q498up 0.458 0.043 q199up 0.324 0.043
q299up 0.361 0.042 q399up 0.388 0.044
q499up 0.530 0.045 q100up 0.526 0.047
q200up 0.633 0.050 q300up 0.671 0.051
q400up 0.877 0.049 q101up 0.762 0.052
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Table 4: Supply Parameter Estimates
main characteristics
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
NetWaresmp 0.005 0.003 NTsmp -0.004 0.003
OS400smp 0.019 0.008 OS390smp 0.203 0.008
OpenVMSsmp -0.033 0.007 Unixsmp 0.007 0.003
Otherossmp 0.029 0.004 Unixmmp 0.190 0.022
NetWareup -0.009 0.007 NTup -0.012 0.006
OS400up -0.015 0.010 OS390up 0.161 0.010
OpenVMSup -0.044 0.011 Unixup -0.012 0.007
Otherosup 0.008 0.007 serversmp 0.092 0.005
CISCsmp 0.261 0.006 RISCsmp 0.063 0.005
ursmp -0.001 0.0003 racksmp -0.006 0.004
ccapacsmp 0.001 0.0001 ccountsmp 0.004 0.0002
CISCmmp 0.413 0.117 RISCmmp 0.350 0.147
ccapacmmp 0.001 0.0001 ccountmmp -0.0002 0.0001
serverup 0.068 0.009 CISCup 0.015 0.009
RISCup -0.022 0.009 urup 0.0004 0.001
rackup 0.004 0.014 constant 0.026 0.008
firm fixed effects
acersmp -0.020 0.011 Amdalsmp -0.063 0.014
ASTsmp -0.025 0.013 copqsmp -0.022 0.010
Cprexsmp 0.046 0.029 Craysmp -3.085 0.109
dtgensmp -0.034 0.011 dellsmp -0.020 0.010
digismp -0.071 0.011 fujismp 0.014 0.011
Fujsimsmp -0.005 0.011 Gatwsmp -0.026 0.010
Bullsmp -0.052 0.013 hwpdsmp 0.004 0.010
Hitachsmp -0.016 0.011 ibmasmp -0.036 0.010
ICLsmp -0.075 0.015 Intgrsmp -0.024 0.016
Micronsmp -0.021 0.012 Mitsusmp -0.007 0.012
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Table 4 (cont.): Supply Parameter Estimates
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
Motorsmp -0.164 0.022 NCRsmp 0.004 0.011
NECsmp -0.012 0.010 olivsmp -0.019 0.012
Othervendorsmp -0.042 0.010 Seqtsmp 0.088 0.014
silismp 0.039 0.012 Siemsmp -0.005 0.010
Stratsmp 0.103 0.011 suunsmp -0.079 0.011
Tandemsmp -0.028 0.019 Toshsmp -0.034 0.011
Unisyssmp -0.009 0.011 VaLinsmp -0.014 0.023
copqmmp -0.167 0.149 fujimmp -0.524 0.154
Fujsimmmp -0.865 0.161 hwpdmmp 0.027 0.148
Hitachmmp -0.248 0.121 ibmammp -0.292 0.145
ICLmmp 0.209 0.182 NECmmp -0.226 0.152
Othervendormmp -0.310 0.145 Siemmmp -0.012 0.151
Tandemmmp -0.190 0.148 acerup 0.002 0.008
Amdalup -0.027 0.018 apleup 0.005 0.014
ASTup -0.006 0.014 copqup -0.002 0.006
dtgenup -0.015 0.012 dellup -0.008 0.013
digiup -0.018 0.006 fujiup 0.003 0.007
Fujsimup 0.012 0.010 Gatwup -0.011 0.018
Bullup 0.057 0.015 hwpdup -0.008 0.006
Hitachup -0.010 0.009 ibmaup 0.003 0.006
Mitsuup 0.024 0.008 Motorup -0.032 0.016
NCRup 0.001 0.012 NECup 0.010 0.006
olivup 0.004 0.009 Siemup 0.001 0.006
suunup -0.034 0.009 Toshup 0.083 0.010
Unisysup -0.012 0.015 VaLinup -0.001 0.033
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Table 4 (cont.): Supply Parameter Estimates
region dummies
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
jasmp 0.015 0.002 ussmp -0.003 0.002
jammp 0.046 0.015 usmmp -0.015 0.012
jaup 0.015 0.004 usup -0.004 0.003
time dummies
q296smp -0.0001 0.006 q396smp 0.001 0.006
q496smp -0.008 0.006 q197smp -0.011 0.006
q297smp -0.010 0.006 q397smp -0.007 0.006
q497smp -0.006 0.005 q198smp -0.013 0.005
q298smp -0.008 0.005 q398smp -0.014 0.005
q498smp -0.021 0.005 q199smp -0.017 0.005
q299smp -0.017 0.005 q399smp -0.012 0.005
q499smp -0.012 0.005 q100smp -0.008 0.005
q200smp -0.004 0.005 q300smp -0.007 0.005
q400smp -0.009 0.005 q101smp -0.010 0.005
q296mmp 0.127 0.028 q396mmp 0.138 0.028
q496mmp 0.134 0.027 q197mmp 0.145 0.027
q297mmp 0.104 0.028 q397mmp 0.100 0.029
q497mmp 0.083 0.032 q198mmp 0.141 0.029
q298mmp 0.104 0.029 q398mmp 0.139 0.030
q498mmp 0.170 0.030 q199mmp 0.080 0.036
q299mmp 0.195 0.031 q399mmp 0.187 0.033
q499mmp 0.151 0.033 q100mmp 0.146 0.034
q200mmp 0.118 0.032 q300mmp 0.136 0.033
q400mmp 0.200 0.032 q101mmp 0.120 0.033
q296up -0.007 0.007 q396up -0.003 0.007
q496up -0.009 0.007 q197up -0.008 0.007
q297up -0.010 0.007 q397up -0.015 0.007
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Table 4 (cont.): Supply Parameter Estimates
parameter estimate st dev parameter estimate st dev
q497up -0.019 0.007 q198up -0.023 0.007
q298up -0.031 0.007 q398up -0.028 0.008
q498up -0.030 0.008 q199up -0.031 0.008
q299up -0.031 0.008 q399up -0.027 0.008
q499up -0.025 0.008 q100up -0.025 0.008
q200up -0.022 0.009 q300up -0.025 0.009
q400up -0.024 0.009 q101up -0.027 0.009
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C.2 Simulation results
Table 5: SSNIP Test for U.S. (1st Quarter, 2001) - 5% Price increase
lower price limit ($) upper price limit ($) # of products % change in profits (4πssnipM )
0 2000 31 -0.4
0 3000 65 -0.2
0 4000 132 1.4
4000 5000 63 -0.7
4000 6000 111 -0.1
4000 7000 121 0.0
4000 8000 140 0.2
8000 9000 12 -10.1
8000 10000 41 -6.1
... ... ... ...
8000 900000 303 4.7
Table 6: SSNIP Test for Europe (1st Quarter, 2001) - 5% Price increase
lower price limit ($) upper price limit ($) # of products % change in profits (4πssnipM )
0 2000 27 -0.4
0 3000 55 -0.4
0 4000 123 1.2
4000 5000 58 -2.1
4000 6000 112 -0.2
4000 7000 134 -0.1
4000 8000 166 0.3
8000 9000 25 -6.7
8000 10000 63 -4.6
... ... ... ...
8000 390000 25 -6.7
8000 400000 311 1.0
400000 1000000 24 -99.9
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Table 7: SSNIP Test for Japan (1st Quarter, 2001) - 5% Price increase
lower price limit ($) upper price limit ($) # of products % change in profits (4πssnipM )
0 2000 17 -0.1
0 3000 27 0.005
3000 4000 50 1.1
4000 5000 44 -1.1
4000 6000 65 -0.8
4000 7000 82 -0.3
4000 8000 107 1.1
8000 9000 12 -5.4
8000 10000 25 -4.8
... ... ... ...
8000 79000 163 -0.7
8000 80000 164 0.9
80000 1000000 65 -80.6
Table 8: SSNIP Test for U.S. (1st Quarter, 2001) - 10% Price increase
lower price limit ($) upper price limit ($) # of products % change in profits (4πssnipM )
0 2000 31 -0.9
0 3000 65 -0.6
0 4000 132 2.4
4000 5000 63 -2.0
4000 6000 111 -1.1
4000 7000 121 -0.9
4000 8000 140 -0.6
4000 9000 152 -0.8
4000 10000 181 0.7
10000 11000 6 -8.5
10000 12000 31 -12.9
... ... ... ...
10000 1000000 264 -8.4
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Table 9: SSNIP Test for Europe (1st Quarter, 2001) - 10% Price increase
lower price limit ($) upper price limit ($) # of products % change in profits (4πssnipM )
0 2000 27 -1.2
0 3000 55 -1.5
0 4000 123 1.7
4000 5000 58 -5.6
4000 6000 112 -2.1
4000 7000 134 -2.0
4000 8000 166 -1.2
4000 9000 191 -0.3
4000 10000 229 2.6
10000 12000 21 -24.7
... ... ... ...
10000 1000000 272 -10.1
Table 10: SSNIP Test for Japan (1st Quarter, 2001) - 10% Price increase
lower price limit ($) upper price limit ($) # of products % change in profits (4πssnipM )
0 2000 17 -0.5
0 3000 27 -0.3
0 4000 77 3.6
4000 5000 44 -4.0
4000 6000 65 -3.4
4000 7000 82 -2.5
4000 8000 107 -0.1
4000 9000 119 1.1
9000 10000 13 -15.8
... ... ... ...
9000 900000 213 -0.5
9000 1000000 217 1.7
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Table 11: FERM test, U.S. (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 10% threshold
lower limit ($) upper limit ($) # of prods % av. price chng (∆pM )
0 2000 31 5.6
0 3000 65 10.5
3000 4000 67 18.8
4000 5000 63 8.1
4000 6000 111 13.0
6000 7000 10 0.2
... ... ... ...
6000 100000 280 9.9
6000 110000 281 10.0
110000 120000 3 -0.001
... ... ... ...
110000 900000 51 1.3
110000 1000000 53 1.5
Table 12: FERM Test, Europe (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 10% threshold
lower limit ($) upper limit ($) # of prods % av. price chng (∆pM )
0 2000 27 4.3
0 3000 55 7.6
0 4000 123 29.1
4000 5000 58 5.1
4000 6000 112 11.0
6000 7000 22 0.2
... ... ... ...
6000 300000 357 9.8
6000 400000 365 10.4
400000 500000 9 0.004
... ... ... ...
400000 1000000 24 0.2
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Table 13: FERM test, Japan (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 10% threshold
lower limit ($) upper limit ($) # of prods % av. price chng (∆pM )
0 2000 17 9.3
0 3000 27 10.0
0 4000 77 42.6
4000 5000 44 3.2
4000 6000 65 4.9
4000 7000 82 6.8
4000 8000 107 11.7
8000 9000 12 0.4
... ... ... ...
8000 900000 225 8.1
8000 1000000 229 8.3
Table 14: FERM test, U.S. (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 15% threshold
lower limit ($) upper limit ($) # of prods % rel. cons.surp. chng (∆csM )
0 2000 31 -4.1
0 3000 65 -8.9
0 4000 132 -34.9
4000 5000 63 -11.0
4000 6000 111 -17.8
6000 7000 10 -0.5
... ... ... ...
6000 14000 114 -14.6
6000 15000 125 -16.2
15000 16000 5 0.0
... ... ... ...
15000 200000 168 -14.6
15000 300000 178 -15.0
300000 400000 6 -1.4
... ... ... ...
800000 900000 2 -0.004
800000 1000000 4 -0.004
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Table 15: FERM test, Europe (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 15% threshold
lower limit ($) upper limit ($) # of prods % rel. cons.surp. chng (∆csM )
0 2000 27 -4.9
0 3000 55 -9.9
0 4000 123 -30.1
4000 5000 58 -11.2
4000 6000 112 -21.2
6000 7000 22 -0.5
... ... ... ...
6000 13000 142 -16.0
13000 14000 9 -0.04
... ... ... ...
13000 79000 178 -15.2
79000 80000 1 0.0
... ... ... ...
79000 800000 67 -22.1
800000 1000000 2 -0.002
Table 16: FERM Test, Japan (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 15% threshold
lower limit ($) upper limit ($) # of prods % rel. cons.surp. chng (∆csM )
0 2000 17 -8.1
0 3000 27 -9.5
0 4000 77 -37.8
4000 5000 44 -8.3
4000 6000 65 -12.0
4000 7000 82 -16.2
7000 8000 25 -6.7
... ... ... ...
7000 11000 53 -18.3
11000 12000 12 -2.1
... ... ... ...
11000 25000 77 -15.3
25000 26000 3 -0.01
... ... ... ...
25000 89000 64 -15.0
89000 1000000 60 -28.8
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Table 17: Summary: Relevant Markets (in dollars), US (1st Quarter, 2001)
SSNIP 5% SSNIP 10% FERM ERMP FERM ERMC
0 - 4000 0 - 4000 0 - 3000 0 - 4000
4000 - 8000 4000 - 10000 3000 - 4000 4000 - 6000
8000 - 900000 4000 - 6000 6000 - 15000
6000 - 110000 15000 - 300000
Data: SSNIP 5%: Table 5; SSNIP 10%: Table 8; FERM ERMP: Table 11; FERM ERMC: Table 14.
Table 18: Summary: Relevant Markets (in dollars), Europe (1st Quarter, 2001)
SSNIP 5% SSNIP 10% FERM ERMP FERM ERMC
0 - 4000 0 - 4000 0 - 4000 0 - 4000
4000 - 8000 4000 - 10000 4000 - 6000 4000 - 6000
8000 - 400000 6000 - 400000 6000 - 13000
400000 - 1000000 13000 - 79000
79000 - 800000
Data: SSNIP 5%: Table 6; SSNIP 10%: Table 9; FERM ERMP: Table 12; FERM ERMC: Table 15.
Table 19: Summary: Relevant Markets (in dollars), Japan (1st Quarter, 2001)
SSNIP 5% SSNIP 10% FERM ERMP FERM ERMC
0 - 3000 0 - 4000 0 - 4000 0 - 4000
3000 - 4000 4000 - 9000 4000 - 8000 4000 - 7000
4000 - 8000 9000 - 1000000 7000 - 11000
8000 - 80000 11000 - 25000
25000 - 89000
89000 - 1000000
Data: SSNIP 5%: Table 7; SSNIP 10%: Table 10; FERM ERMP: Table 13; FERM ERMC: Table 16.
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Figure 1: SSNIP Test for U.S. (1st Quarter, 2001) - 5% Price increase
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Figure 2: SSNIP Test for Europe (1st Quarter, 2001) - 5% Price increase
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Figure 3: SSNIP Test for Japan (1st Quarter, 2001) - 5% Price increase
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Figure 4: FERM test, U.S. (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 10% threshold
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Figure 5: FERM test, Europe (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 10% threshold
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Figure 6: FERM test, Japan (1st Quarter, 2001): ERMP Index, 10% threshold
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